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According to the restructuring hypothesis, insight problem solving typically progresses
through consecutive stages of search, impasse, insight, and search again for someone,
who solves the task. The order of these stages was determined through self-reports
of problem solvers and has never been verified behaviorally. We asked whether
individual analysis of problem solving attempts of participants revealed the same order
of problem solving stages as defined by the theory and whether their subjective feelings
corresponded to the problem solving stages they were in. Our participants tried to solve
the Five-Square problem in an online task, while we recorded the time and trajectory
of their stick movements. After the task they were asked about their feelings related to
insight and some of them also had the possibility of reporting impasse while working on
the task. We found that the majority of participants did not follow the classic four-stage
model of insight, but had more complex sequences of problem solving stages, with
search and impasse recurring several times. This means that the classic four-stage
model is not sufficient to describe variability on the individual level. We revised the classic
model and we provide a new model that can generate all sequences found. Solvers
reported insight more often than non-solvers and non-solvers reported impasse more
often than solvers, as expected; but participants did not report impassemore often during
behaviorally defined impasse stages than during other stages. This shows that impasse
reports might be unreliable indicators of impasse. Our study highlights the importance of
individual analysis of problem solving behavior to verify insight theory.
Keywords: insight, problem solving stages, impasse, four-stage model, Five-Square problem
Introduction
Insight Tasks and the Restructuring Hypothesis
Insight tasks are used in cognitive psychology to study insight problem solving (Öllinger and
Knoblich, 2009). An example is the Five-Square problem (Katona, 1940), where problem solvers
see a cross shape made of matchsticks (Figure 1) and they have to replace three matchsticks in
order to get a shape of four squares of equal size instead of the given five squares in the cross
shape. According to the restructuring hypothesis, insight problem solving is different from analytic
problem solving (Fleck and Weisberg, 2013): problem solvers cannot assess how far they are
from the solution (Metcalfe and Wiebe, 1987), and the solution pops into the problem solvers’
mind suddenly and unexpectedly, evoking an Eureka moment, or “Aha!” experience (Durso et al.,
1994; Wegner, 2002). This moment of enlightenment is usually—according to some, necessarily
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(Ohlsson, 1992; Knoblich et al., 1999, 2001; Jones, 2003; Öllinger
et al., 2014a)—preceded by a longer period of impasse when the
problem solver gets stuck and has no idea how to proceed.
The restructuring hypothesis explains these phenomena by a
need for structural change in the mental representation of the
problem (Wertheimer, 1959; Ohlsson, 1984a,b, 1992; Fleck and
Weisberg, 2013). When the problem solver starts working on the
task, the candidate solutions that the problem solver considers
are unnecessarily constrained by some false assumptions about
the task. The search space in which the person is looking
for the solution does not contain the solution, because it is
overly restricted. For example, in the Five-Square problem, most
problem solvers start placing sticks to positions that touch
original stick positions, i.e., they do not consider putting sticks
further away from the initial shape. According to Öllinger et al.
FIGURE 1 | The initial position of sticks on the grid in the five square
problem. For the solution, see the Supplementary Material. We show a
5-by-5 grid here, but in the computerized task, the cross shape was in the
middle of a 9-by-9 grid.
TABLE 1 | Three levels of description of insight problem solving stages for a successful problem solver who goes through restructuring.
Level of description Stage 1: constrained
search
Stage 2: impasse Stage 3: insight Stage 4: extended
search
Stage 5: solution
Cognitive level (what
goes on in the problem
solver’s mind)
Conscious search in the
initial, constrained search
space (constraints,
heuristics)
Unconscious search;
incubation; fixation;
parallel search
Representational change:
the self-imposed constraints
on the search space are
relaxed
Conscious search in the
new, extended search
space
Finding the solution
Behavioral level (what
the problem solver
does)
The problem solver
repeatedly tries to solve
the problem (makes
moves)
The problem solver is
inactive or the problem
solver repeats his previous
moves
The problem solver makes
the critical move: the first
move outside the
constrained search space
The problem solver
repeatedly tries to solve the
problem (makes moves)
The problem solver
solves the problem
Affective level (what the
problem solver feels)
Determination, motivation The problem solver feels
stuck, frustrated and does
not know how to proceed
Insight, “Aha!” experience,
Eureka moment
Excitement Success,
satisfaction
(2014a), they are constrained by the false assumption that the
shape should stay in one piece. After failing several times, the
problem solver reaches an impasse and feels that there is no way
to get closer to the solution (Ohlsson, 1992). During an impasse
problem solvers either do nothing or they repeat previous
attempts to solve the task (Beeftink et al., 2008). Those people
who do not solve the task get stuck in this state, while others
overcome the self-imposed constraints. The latter start to look
for the solution in an extended search space, in which, eventually
they find the solution (in the Five-Square problem, they start
putting sticks to further positions, and decompose the initial
cross shape). Overcoming constraints and restructuring the task
in one’s mind is often accompanied by an “Aha!” experience that
is usually used as the defining feature of insight problem solving
(Bowden and Beeman, 1998; Boden, 2004; Bowden et al., 2005;
Kounios et al., 2006; Danek et al., 2013, 2014).
Levels of Description of Problem Solving Stages
The reader might have realized that in the description above,
problem solving stages are sometimes described by the cognitive
process that supposedly goes on in the problem solver’s mind
(Wallas, 1926), other times by what the problem solver does or
feels (Danek et al., 2014). We see a lack of clarity in this regard in
the literature, so here we would like to disentangle the different
levels of description, and identify which phenomena belong to
the cognitive, behavioral and affective level (Table 1).
The first stage is most often described on the behavioral level:
the problem solver repeatedly attempts to solve the task, but fails.
The underlying cognitive process is supposed to be conscious
search in the initial, constrained search space (e.g., MacGregor
et al., 2001). The second stage, impasse, is usually identified
by mental states: frustration, feeling being stuck, not knowing
how to proceed (Ohlsson, 1992; Danek et al., 2014). People
who cannot solve the task get stuck in this stage. Its behavioral
correlates are either inactivity, or repeating previous moves or
candidate solutions (Ohlsson, 1992; Jones, 2003; Beeftink et al.,
2008). We do not know what happens during impasse on the
cognitive level but we hypothesize that there is an underlying
unconscious search process that could result in lifting the
constraints of the initial search space (Metcalfe and Wiebe, 1987;
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Bowers et al., 1990; Seifert et al., 1994; Bowden and Beeman, 1998;
Kounios and Beeman, 2014). According to others, incubation
is important in this process (Seifert et al., 1994; Beeftink et al.,
2008): taking breaks from the task increases solution rate.
Recently, Dietrich and Haider (2014) and Fernando et al. (2010)
proposed that the underlying search might be evolutionary and
parallel in nature. That means that several search processes are
launched at the same time and their results are tested against
a criterion of success (fitness function). The most promising
candidates are copied, and modified until a solution is found or
a dead-end is reached. The third stage, insight, is named after its
affective correlate, but its most important feature is the cognitive
process of representational change, or restructuring (Knoblich
et al., 1999). Its behavioral correlate (or rather causal effect) is
sometimes identified as the critical move—the first move that
goes outside the restricted search space (Jones, 2003). The fourth
stage is conscious search again, but now, in the extended search
space, at the end of which the problem solver finds the solution
(Öllinger et al., 2014b). The fourth stage could be very brief
(depending on the problem) because problem solvers often find
the solution shortly after representational change, if they have the
right insight. Probably because of this, it is sometimes unclear
whether the “Aha!” experience is associated with restructuring
or with finding the solution. Note that once the problem solver
gets into the impasse, representational change is necessary, but
not sufficient for solving the problem: some problem solvers
cannot solve the task even when they are told to relax the
constraint (Weisberg and Alba, 1982; Kershaw et al., 2013).
On the other hand, it is possible to solve insight tasks without
going through impasse and insight, if the first search space is
sufficient.
The cognitive level is the most interesting for us, but since
it is hidden, we can only observe the behavioral and emotional
correlates of cognitive processes. The affective level cannot be
directly assessed, because we either have to rely on subjective
reports of problem solvers about their feelings or we could
measure correlates of their emotions (e.g., heart rate, galvanic
skin response, piloerection, pupil dilation). The behavioral level
can be described easily and objectively. Behavioral measures
during insight problem solving usually involve the moves that
problem solvers make in order to solve the task. The difficulty
is to get enough data from participants and to convince them to
act out their thoughts instead of trying to solve the problem in
their heads.
Models: The Order of Problem Solving Stages
Wallas (1926) described the stages of insight problem solving
as preparation, incubation, illumination, and verification. These
roughly correspond to the stages described above. More recently,
researchers constructed box-and-arrow type models, which
show the possible sequences of problem solving stages (see
Figures 2, 3). These models usually agree that the sequence of
stages is different for people who solve the task with insight—
who go through all the stages described above—from those who
solve the task without insight; and that people who fail to solve
the task get stuck in the impasse stage.
For example, based on Beeftink et al.’s (2008) model
(Figure 2), the sequence of stages could be:
• Search→ solve for people, who solve the task without impasse
and insight,
• Search → fixation → search for people who can’t solve the
task, and
• Search→ fixation→ incubation→ insight→ solve for people
who solve the task with restructuring.
In their model, fixation is an unconscious state, where
people keep repeating previous problem solving attempts and
incubation happens when the problem solver is in the conscious
state of impasse: after unsuccessful attempts accumulate and
reach a threshold, problem solvers realize that they are stuck and
they take a break. Their model emphasizes the difference between
routes with and without incubation: although it is possible that
one cannot solve the task even after incubation, but it is not
possible to solve the task without it.
Öllinger et al.’s (2014b) model (Ohlsson, 1992; based on Jones,
2003) does not differentiate between fixation and incubation,
but these are implicitly included in the impasse stage. Their
model generates search → solution, and search → impasse →
representational change → search → solution sequences
(Figure 3).
FIGURE 2 | Beeftink et al.’s (2008) stage model of insight problem solving (modified figure). Gray areas are part of impasse.
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FIGURE 3 | Öllinger et al. (2014b) stage model of insight problem
solving (original figure).
Search Space in the Five-Square Problem
The search space of the Five-Square problem consists of the
possible positions where the matchsticks could be placed (Simon
and Newell, 1974). In our version of the task, this space was
discretized: sticks could reside only on 180 predefined grid
positions. The search space limits the number of possible stick
movements, but it is probably still much larger than the actual
search space of problem solvers—the collection of grid positions
that they consider for a solution—because they rarely put sticks
on the outer positions of the grid.
In a previous study, Öllinger et al. (2014a) found that the
self-imposed constraint in this task is to keep the original shape
in one piece, so we hypothesized that participants would first
only use grid positions close to the original shape. They would
quickly exhaust this search space and start repeating previously
explored grid positions with their stick movements. Problem
solvers who overcome this constraint expand their search space.
The behavioral correlate should be the selection of new grid
positions—including those that are part of the solution—further
away from the cross shape.
The Present Study
We propose an objective behavioral measure to define problem
solving stages individually.We aimed to validate the stagemodels
of insight by testing their predictions against this data. We were
also interested how participants’ subjective feelings correlate with
their behavior.
We used the number of explored grid positions as a behavioral
measure and tracked its changes through the problem solving
attempts of participants. The grid positions explored by problem
solvers are taken as instances from their cognitive search space
and as such provide us with a window to their cognitive processes.
Based on the stage model of insight, we predicted that in the
case of problem solvers, who solve the task through restructuring,
the number of explored grid positions would increase with every
move at the beginning, until it reaches a plateau. The plateau
indicates that the participant exhausted the possibilities within
the constrained representation of the problem, and with every
consecutivemove the participant just repeats previous source and
target positions. Participants could repeat positions even before
exhausting the possibilities if they forget their previous moves.
Some participants would give up, and stay inactive for longer
periods of time. Both inactivity, and repetitions are taken as
behavioral correlates of impasse (Beeftink et al., 2008), i.e., they
can be used to objectively—independently of the problem solvers’
feelings—identify the impasse stage. Some participants would
get stuck in this stage, while others would get an insight and
continue searching again. The search of an individual who had
an insight is unconstrained by the idea that the shape should stay
in one piece, so the person could put sticks further away from the
original figure, and the number of explored grid positions would
increase again until the person finds the solution. To sum up, we
defined problem solving stages based on the curve of the number
of explored grid positions through time for each participant
individually and predicted that the sequence of problem solving
stages would follow the process models of insight.
We also asked participants about their feelings related to
insight and impasse. In our study, we used two self-reporting
measures: an online impasse report and a post-hoc insight report.
We asked participants in the impasse monitoring group to press
a button when they felt being stuck during the task. After
finishing the task, we asked all participants whether they had an
“Aha!” experience (Danek et al., 2014). We predicted that more
solvers would report insight than non-solvers, because successful
solvers can have an “Aha!” experience, non-solvers probably
cannot. We also predicted that non-solvers would report impasse
more often than solvers, because all non-solvers should have an
impasse, while solvers do not have it necessarily (it is possible to
solve the task without impasse). We predicted that participants
would report impasse during periods of frequent repetitions and
inactivity, i.e., during the behaviorally defined impasse stage.
According to Kounios and Beeman (2014) having an impasse is
not necessary for having an “Aha!” experience—we wanted to see
whether this claim holds for the five square problem too.
Methods
The Task and Design
In the Five-Square problem (Katona, 1940), the task is to reduce
the number of five squares seen on Figure 1 to four squares.
Participants should move three sticks to new grid positions
without discarding any sticks (see solution in the Supplementary
Material, Data Sheet 2).
We introduced two experimental groups. In the impasse
monitoring group participants were provided with a description
of the impasse feeling before they started the task, and they
were asked to press a button when they felt like that during the
task. A second group served as a control group to see whether
the metacognitive task of monitoring one’s impasse state had an
impact on problem solving success.
Participants
Recruitment
Four participants were recruited at Queen Mary University,
London; the rest of the participants were recruited on the
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Internet, via a crowdsourcing platform called CrowdFlower.
Here, people willing to work online can sign up and then
choose from the available jobs that employers offer. We
recruited “level 3 workers,” who are the highest rated, most
trustworthy group of workers on CrowdFlower. They received
one dollar as a payment. The participants were randomly
assigned to either the impasse monitoring group or the control
group.
Our experiments obey the Declaration of Helsinki (2013).
We followed the code and the ethical principles of the
German Psychological Society and the European Commission.
Participants were allowed to quit the online experiment any time
without providing a reason.
Sample Size
We had more than twice as many participants in the impasse
monitoring group than in the control group because we wanted
to analyse the impasse monitoring group in more detail, namely
perform a paired t-test on those participants who pressed the
impasse button. We computed the required sample size for this
test a priori with the G∗ Power software (Faul et al., 2007),
assuming a medium effect size (0.5) and setting α = 0.05 and
power = 0.8. According to the analysis, the sample size for a
matched-pairs t-test with these parameters should be 34, which
we multiplied by 2.5 thinking that about half of the participants
won’t be able to solve the task and not all of these will press the
impasse button. At the end, this analysis proved to be insufficient,
since we assumed normal distribution, but the data was not
normally distributed, so we had to do a non-parametric test
instead of the planned paired t-test.
Exclusion Criteria
We excluded all participants who closed the software before
either they solved the task or the 15min elapsed, even if
they restarted the software afterwards. We did this, because
we could not monitor their behavior while the program was
closed.
Demographics
After excluding participants who closed the software early, 129
participants remained; 42 in the control group and 87 in the
impasse monitoring group. There were 27 females and 102
males. The average age of participants was 30.3 years (range 16–
69). We had participants from 37 countries and five continents
(Europe= 59, Asia= 44, North-America= 9, South-America=
12, Africa = 5). The solvers and non-solvers were almost equally
distributed across continents. Only four countries had more than
five participants (India: 20, USA: 9, Romania: 7, UK: 6). Most of
our participants had some higher education. Eleven participants
had basic levels of English, the rest judged their English as
intermediate level or higher.
Materials and Procedures
Weprovided a downloadable version of the Five-Square problem,
written inMicrosoft Visual Basic R©, on the Internet. The program
was run individually on the participants’ computers and guided
them through the experiment autonomously.
The program started with a practice trial, where participants
had to drag and drop four sticks on the screen to four different
grid positions. After completing this task participants received
the following written instruction:
“You will see five squares made of sticks on the screen. Your task is
to move exactly three sticks to produce four squares of equal size,
while leaving no sticks that are not part of squares.
After three moves the task resets automatically or you can reset
it anytime by pressing the Reset button. You can try to solve the task
as many times as you like, in fact, try to show us all your ideas by
moving the sticks, don’t just try to solve the task in your head. You
will have 15min to solve the task—try to use all of it. It is not a
problem, if you cannot solve the task, but if you close the program
before 15min elapsed, your submission will be invalid.”
Participants in the impasse-monitoring group received an
additional instruction:
“Sometimes before solving a difficult problem people feel like they
are stuck, they are not getting closer to the solution. We would like
to know if you feel like this during the task, so in this case please
press the ‘I’m stuck’ button. You can press the button more than
once if you feel that this feeling increases.”
After receiving the instructions, the initial figure of five
squares appeared on the screen and participants could move the
sticks by drag-and-drop with the mouse. The program recorded
the movement of the sticks and the button presses (Impasse
button and Restart button) along with the time that passed since
starting the task. It has automatically checked whether a correct
solution was achieved.
Participants were allowed to restart from the initial
configuration of sticks as often as they wanted by pressing the
“Restart” button. Alternatively, the program reset automatically
after unsuccessful attempts of three moves and provided
feedback (“This is not a correct solution. Please, try again!”).
After solving the problem or reaching the upper time limit of
15min, participants were asked to post the output log file to the
experimenter via our website and to complete a short online
questionnaire (about their age, gender, handedness, vision,
educational background, nationality, mother tongue, and level
of English). All participants were asked whether they solved the
problem with or without insight:
“Some people feel a sudden, unexpected, unintended, and
surprising moment where a solution pops into someone’s mind. The
accompanying experience is often called ‘Aha!’ experience. Did you
have this feeling before or when you solved the task?”
The participants had to choose between the following answers:
I did not solve the task; No, I did not feel anything like this; Yes,
I felt exactly like this; Other: [free text].
Analyses of Problem Solving Stages
We plotted the number of explored grid positions vs. time
for each participant individually (see Figures 4, 6 and the
Supplementary Material). On these plots, each point represents
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a move (dragging-and-dropping one stick). The number of
explored grid positions includes the source positions (where the
stick was picked up from) and the target positions (where the
stick was put down to). With each move, it either increases
by two (if the move consisted of new source and target
positions), increases by one (if either the source position or
the target position is a position that has already been used—
i.e., if the move involves a repetition of a grid position), or
stays constant (if both the source and the target position are
repetitions).
For the purposes of our analyses, we defined three different
patterns on these plots:
• A slope consists of minimum three consecutive moves that
continuously increase the number of explored grid positions.
This means that each move within the slope includes at
least one new grid position that the participant has not used
before.
• A plateau consists of minimum three consecutive moves that
do not increase the number of explored grid positions. Moves
within the plateau consist of repetitions of previously used grid
positions.
• A gap is a period of time between two moves if it is longer
than the average time between two consecutive moves for the
participant + 2∗SD. In case of first moves of trials, the time
between the move and the last move of the previous trial
includes the time spent by restarting the task, because the
figure was visible during restarting.
On the behavioral level, these patterns translate to search,
repetition and inactivity, respectively, which we hypothesize to
indicate the cognitive phases of search (slope) and impasse
(plateau or gap). We identified slopes, plateaus and gaps in the
plots of each participant and looked at whether they conformed
to the sequence of problem solving stages generated by the box-
and-arrow models of insight problem solving. Figure 4 shows
a made up example: it summarizes our predictions about the
FIGURE 4 | The number of explored grid positions vs. time, cartoon
figure with made up data. This is what we expected the performance of a
typical solver would look like. Each data point on these plots represents a stick
movement. Slopes, plateaus, and gaps (see definitions in the Methods
section) are identified and demarcated by black vertical lines.
behavior of a typical solver conforming to current models of
insight problem solving.
Results
Effect of Manipulation
To control whether the additional metacognitive task in
the impasse monitoring group affected problem solving
performance, we compared the two groups in terms of solution
rate and solution time.
Solution Rate
The overall solution rate was 51%; 55% in the control group and
49% in the impasse monitoring group (Table 2). According to the
Chi-square test, the difference was not significant: χ2(1, N= 129) =
0.14, p = 0.70,8= 0.03.
Solution Time
Twenty nine participants solved the task under 1min in the two
groups. The rest of the solution times were more or less evenly
distributed between 2 and 15min. We compared the solution
time of solvers in the control group and the impasse monitoring
group with a Mann-Whitney U-test—the difference between the
groups was not significant, U = 424.00, p = 0.34, r = 0.12. For
non-solvers, the task always ended after 15min in both groups.
Since we did not find differences between the groups, we
merged them for the rest of the analyses, except when we looked
at the impasse monitoring group separately for the subjective
impasse feeling analysis.
Exclusion Criteria for Data Analysis
There were 28 participants who only had one trial. Twenty six
of these solved the task under 32 s; one solved it in 3.4min and
another one did not solve it. It is probable that the former solved
the task in his head and the latter gave up after only one trial,
and those 26 participants, who solved it in about half minute
either already knew the task or just found the solution instantly.
We excluded these 28 participants from the rest of the analyses,
because we do not have enough movement data from them and
also because we suspect that they knew the solution in advance.
One hundred and one participants remained, 34 in the control
group (15 solvers) and 67 in the impasse monitoring group (24
solvers). The overall solution rate decreased to 39%.
Target Positions
To illustrate how the actual search space of participants changed
over time we plotted the grid with hues proportional to the
relative frequency of positions used as targets (Figure 5)—for
TABLE 2 | Solution rate in the two experimental groups.
Participants Control group Impasse monitoring group Total
Solvers 23 43 66
Non-solvers 19 44 63
Total 42 87 129
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FIGURE 5 | The frequency of grid positions used as target
positions in the moves of solvers in the first quarter of their
moves (left) and the last quarter of their moves (right). The
shades of grid positions represent a heat map: the darker the shade,
the more frequently the position was chosen. Invisible positions were
not used at all.
calculating the relative frequencies we used the first half of moves
of each participant for the plot on the left and the second half of
moves of each participant for the plot on the right.
We can see that the most frequent positions were the ones
closest to the original cross shape (those that complemented the
cross shape to a three-by-three square); the frequency of these
eight positions (drawn in black in Figure 5 because they had the
highest frequency) decreased over time: M = 51.4, SD = 3.6 in
the first half of moves, and M = 38.4, SD = 9.9 in the second
half of moves, t(7) = 3.6, p = 0.009, d = 2.7032. On the other
hand, the frequency of those 12 positions that could be part of the
solution increased over time: M = 9.8, SD = 3.9 in the first half
of moves, and M = 19.9, SD = 3.6 in the second half of moves,
t(11) = 9.6, p < 0.0001, d = 5.8029.
Repetition Rate
We compared the proportion of repeated positions of solvers and
non-solvers. According to the unpaired t-test, the repetition rate
of non-solvers (M = 0.5, SD= 0.2) was significantly higher than
that of solvers (M = 0.3, SD = 0.3), t(99) = 5.13, p < 0.0001,
d = 1.03.
Problem Solving Stages
We looked at the number of explored grid positions through
time for each participant (see the figures in the Supplementary
Material and four examples in Figure 6) and we identified slopes,
plateaus, and gaps, as defined in the Methods section. There were
uncategorized moves that did not fall into neither slopes, nor
plateaus—for the sake of simplicity, we ignored these. For 11
solvers and 6 non-solvers there was a gap before the first move—
we disregarded these gaps too, because probably these were not
signs of impasse.
All participants had at least one slope. The gap was missing in
case of 5 solvers and 1 non-solver and the plateau was missing in
case of 16 solvers and 5 non-solvers. Table 3 shows the different
sequences, their interpretation and the number of participants
who had such a sequence. We categorized the sequences based
on whether they conformed to the stagemodel of insight problem
solving.
We have found that 49% (19 out of 39) of the solvers and 13%
(8 out of 62) of the non-solvers followed the classic stagemodel of
insight. The rest of the participants hadmore complex sequences,
with search and impasse stages recurring several times.
Subjective Feelings of Insight and Impasse
Subjective Insight, Impasse, and Success
In the two groups, 74% of the solvers (29 participants out of 39
solvers) and 10% of the non-solvers (6 participants out of 62
non-solvers) reported insight feeling after the task. According
to the Chi-square test with Yates correction, the association
between having an insight and being a solver was significant,
χ
2
(1, N= 101) = 41.42, p < 0.0001,8= 0.64.
In the impasse monitoring group 33% of the solvers (8
participants out of 24 solvers) and 79% of the non-solvers (34
participants out of 43 non-solvers) pressed the impasse button at
least once. According to the Chi-square test with Yates correction,
the association between pressing the impasse button and being a
non-solver was significant, χ2(1, N= 67) = 11.89, p < 0.0006, 8 =
0.42.
Temporal Distribution of Impasse Button Presses
We tested whether participants in the impasse monitoring group
tended to press the impasse button during plateaus and gaps
or during slopes. There were 42 participants who pressed the
button at least once—only these participants were included in the
following two analyses.
We calculated the number of impasse button presses per
minute during plateaus and gaps together and during slopes.
According to the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test, the
medians did not differ significantly, Z = 0.63, p = 0.53, r = 0.10.
This is quite unexpected so we checked whether non-solvers
tended to press the impasse button more often during the second
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FIGURE 6 | The number of explored grid positions vs. time. This
figure shows data from four participants (two solvers, two non-solvers).
The plots of all the participants can be found in the Supplementary
Data. Examples plotted in green (#18 and #4) are from solvers,
examples plotted in red (#79 and #7) are from non-solvers. Examples
#18 and #79 conform to the stage model of insight, whereas
examples #4 and #7 reveal more complex sequences of problem
solving stages. Each data point on these plots represents a stick
movement. Slopes, plateaus, and gaps (see definitions in the Methods
section) are highlighted with different shades of gray: slopes are dark
gray, plateaus are medium, and gaps are light gray. Asterisks on the
horizontal axis indicate the time of impasse button presses in case of
participant #79 (the rest of the participants in this figure were in the
control group).
half of the task (7.5–15min) than during the first half of the task
(0–7.5min). According to the paired t-test, the difference was not
significant, t(33) = 0.46, p = 0.65, d = 0.16.
Association of Plateaus and Gaps with Reported
“Aha!” Experience
We compared the length of plateaus and gaps of solvers,
who reported insight and solvers, who did not report insight.
According to the unpaired t-test the difference was not
significant, t(37) = 1.04, p = 0.31, d = 0.3403. In fact, there were
three solvers, who reported insight and did not have any plateaus
or gaps, just a short slope.
Discussion and Conclusions
Summary of Results
We investigated problem solving stages in the Five-Square
problem based on the main assumptions of the restructuring
hypothesis of insight, i.e., that problem solving proceeds
in different stages, including conscious search, impasse, and
restructuring. We used a behavioral measure, the time and
trajectory of stick movements by participants, to objectively
define problem solving stages. This was based on the assumptions
that during search the problem solver explores new grid
positions, while during impasse, the problem solver either repeats
previously explored grid positions or stays inactive. We analyzed
how these stages follow each other and how they correlate with
subjective impasse and insight feelings of the participants.
We have found that less than half of the successful problem
solvers, and 13% of the unsuccessful participants followed
the sequence of problem solving stages that the stage models
of insight predicted. The rest of the participants had more
complicated sequences of search and impasse, with these stages
alternating several times. This means that the stage models
must be extended to explain variability on the individual level.
Most of this variability disappears in group-level analysis, which
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TABLE 3 | Sequences of problem solving stages, their interpretation and the number of participants who had such a sequence.
Sequence of problem solving
stages
Interpretation Number of
participants
Conforms to the stage
model of insight?
Sum
Solvers Slope Solved the task without impasse 8 Yes 19 solvers (49%)
Slope—alternating gaps and
plateaus—slope
Classic search—impasse—search
sequence, with probably an insight
before the second search stage
7 Yes
Slope—alternating gaps and plateaus Classic search—impasse—search
sequence but the moves leading to
the solution were already used before
4 Yes
Other sequences with alternating
slopes, gaps and plateaus
Recurrent search and impasse stages 20 No 20 solvers (51%)
Non-solvers Slope—alternating gaps and plateaus Search—impasse 7 Yes 8 non-solvers (13%)
Plateau—slope—alternating gaps
and plateaus
Search—impasse 1 Yes
Slope Search (probably gave up before
reaching impasse)
1 No 54 non-solvers (87%)
Other sequences with alternating
slopes, gaps and plateaus
Recurrent search and impasse stages 53 No
The last column on the right summarizes how many solvers and non-solvers conformed (gray background) or did not conform (white background) to the stage model of insight.
highlights the importance of individual analysis of problem
solving behavior.
Solvers reported insight feeling more often than non-solvers
and non-solvers reported impasse feeling more often than
solvers, as it was expected. We predicted that the behaviorally
defined impasse would correlate with the subjective feelings of
participants, but we did not find temporal correlation between
objective impasse stages and subjective impasse reports. This
shows that impasse reports might be unreliable indicators of
impasse.
Empirical Validation of Problem Solving Stages
Although it has long been proposed that the process of
insight problem solving can be divided into stages (Ohlsson,
1992; Sandkühler and Bhattacharya, 2008), there were
very few studies that tried to empirically validate this
hypothesis.
Knoblich et al. (2001) asked participants to solve matchstick
arithmetic tasks while recording their eye-movements. They
divided the problem solving time of each participant in three
equally long intervals and compared mean fixation durations
across intervals. They found that mean fixation duration
increased across intervals on average, which they took as a sign
that more and more participants entered impasse with time. This
finding is based on the assumption that impasse is associated
with longer fixations, because people tend to stare blankly at
the screen when they don’t know what to do. They also found
that people tend to fixate on different elements of the task in
each interval: in the first interval their attention is differentially
allocated on elements that are consistent with the constrained
search space induced by prior knowledge, while in the second
and third intervals successful solvers look more at the elements
of the extended search space. These findings seem to support the
search-impasse sequence predicted by stage models of insight,
however, the results were based on group level analyses, which
mask individual variation.
Jones (2003) criticized that Knoblich et al. (2001) determined
problem solving stages post-hoc. He examined move durations
and eye-movements during two versions of the car park problem.
He defined impasse as a longer break before the critical
(insightful) move, i.e., in his definition, impasse is a time interval
between two moves. This longer thinking time before the critical
move also coincided with longer fixation times. In Jones’s study
there is only one impasse per definition, moreover, he also
assumed that participants did not make moves during impasse,
which we find problematic.
Fleck and Weisberg (2013) analyzed insight problem solving
by thinking-aloud protocols (Ericsson and Simon, 1993). They
found only weak evidence for the “classic impasse-restructuring-
insight sequence” (p. 436), instead, participants used a variety
of strategies. E.g., some participants solved the problem by
using prior knowledge that they gathered from the solution
of similar problems. Other participants solved the problem
by the application of heuristics that helped them to restrict
the search space. At last, some participants restructured their
problem representation after they failed several times. Only these
participants supposedly went through the problem solving stages
described by the restructuring hypothesis.
A New Model for Insight Problem Solving
Our main finding—that in most cases problem solving stages
do not follow the simple stage model of insight—highlights
the need for revising the model. The model should be able to
explain recurring search and insight stages. There are different
versions of the model, but all include search, impasse and
restructuring/insight, but none of them can generate the variety
of the sequences of these stages that we found. For example,
Beeftink et al.’s (2008) model could be extended with loops to
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be able to account for various problem solving types. Their
model already includes the possibility to go back to search
behavior (“work on a problem”) once more after the impasse
(Start working on a problem→ Problem progress→ Fixation→
Continue to work on problem), but it does not allow to go
back more than once or to go back and forth between fixation
(repetitions) and incubation (inactivity). Öllinger et al.’s (2014b)
model could also be modified to allow for a more flexible
sequence of stages by making the arrow between search and
impasse double headed.
We provide our own version of the model in Figure 7. It
emphasizes that both before restructuring and after restructuring
search, repetitions, and inactivity could follow each other in any
order: each stage is accessible from the other two stages. Our
model clearly separates the behavioral and the cognitive level,
emphasizing the difference between objective observations and
theory.
Box-and-arrow type stage models explain the order
of problem solving stages, and the underlying theory of
representational change explains—to some extent—what drives
the process through these stages. Repetitions and inactivity on
the cognitive level are supposedly caused by the confined search
space: when there is a finite number of candidate solutions, after
trying enough of them, the problem solver inevitably bumps
into repeating previous ones, unless the problem solver takes
a break. We found that non-solvers have a higher repetition
rate than solvers which could be the result of either a smaller
search space, more time spent in impasse or poorer working
memory. Restructuring leads to an extended search space,
which includes more candidate solutions and among them, the
solution, and thus repetitions and inactivity is less frequent than
in the restricted search space.
Limitations
Impasse Button Presses
There has been a long tradition of identifying different problem
solving stages by self-reports or thinking aloud protocols
(Duncker and Lees, 1945; Schooler et al., 1993; Jung-Beeman
et al., 2004; Danek et al., 2013; Fleck and Weisberg, 2013), but
most often, self-reports about the “Aha!” experience are used only
to differentiate between insight and non-insight solutions (Jung-
Beeman et al., 2004). To our knowledge, there were no studies so
far that tried to find an association between the time of impasse
reports and some other, objectively defined impasse stage.
We did not find a temporal correlation between the objectively
defined impasse and the impasse reports of participants.
There are several possibilities why this happened so. The
link between the objectively defined impasse stage and the
FIGURE 7 | Box-and-arrow model of insight problem solving. White
circles include problem solving stages described on the behavioral level.
Gray shading refers to the cognitive level. Repetition and inactivity are
sub-stages of impasse. Problem solving can either start in the restricted
search space and then continue in the extended search space after
restructuring, or could start in the extended search space right away.
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impasse reports of participants has several elements: the cognitive
impasse state causes repetitions and inactivity on the behavioral
level that we used to objectively define impasse. The same
cognitive state might cause the subjective feeling of being stuck
which should remind the participant to press the impasse
button.
It is possible that the subjective feelings of participants do not
correlate with their cognitive state of impasse, i.e., they are not
aware that they are in an impasse. Another possibility is that
the subjective feeling does not correlate with the button presses:
either because our instructions were unclear about the impasse,
or because subjects left the computer during some of the gaps
and thus were not in the position to press the button.
Of course, it is also possible that repetition and inactivity are
not reliable signals of impasse or that the definitions we used to
operationalize themwere ineffective. In the literature impasse has
a double definition: on the one hand it is defined behaviorally
as repetitions and/or inactivity (Knoblich et al., 2001; Jones,
2003; Beeftink et al., 2008); on the other hand it is defined as
a feeling of being stuck (Ohlsson, 1992). We believe that it is
better to start with the objective behavioral definition than with
the subjective definition based on feelings. In our data, subjective
impasse reports are equally likely to occur at the beginning,
middle or end of the problem solving time—they do not show any
obvious pattern or aggregation. The other problem is that they
are quite infrequent so it would be hard to define stages based
on them. But most importantly, we believe that stick movements
are better reflections of the cognitive processes going on in the
problem solver’s mind than his feelings, let alone button presses
supposedly based on his feelings. Monitoring one’s feelings is a
parallel task, besides the main task of problem solving and the
problem solver most likely concentrates more on solving the task
than analysing and reporting his feelings.
We should also explain the counter-intuitive finding that 6
of the non-solvers reported having an “Aha!” experience. There
could be several reasons for that. It is possible that participants
did not understand our instructions properly, or that these
participants had a kind of partial or wrong insight (Öllinger and
Knoblich, 2009). It is also possible that the “Aha!” experience is
not linked to representational change (Danek et al., 2014).
Online Task
Our overall solution rate was a bit higher than expected (54%),
but more importantly, we had several participants who solved
the task very quickly. This could raise suspicion about the
reliability of the online task: after all, without supervision from
the experimenter, participants could look up the solution of the
task online, or they could seek help from someone else. To
decrease this possibility, we excluded participants who solved
the task in one trial and kept only those who generated more
data. The solution rate after the exclusion was 39%, which is
comparable to previous studies (Öllinger et al., 2014a).
No supervision also meant that participants could act more
freely, and that they were in a familiar setting (probably their
homes), which allowed them to take a break whenever they
wanted. In laboratory experiments participants probably feel
pressure from the experimenter to move sticks at a constant pace,
which could result in loosing inactivity as a measure of impasse
in a laboratory setting.
Using an online crowdsourcing platform, such as
CrowdFlower also helped us to recruit participants with a
variety of backgrounds. Research in cognitive psychology suffers
from the homogeneity of participant populations: between 2003
and 2007, about 80% of participants in psychological experiments
were undergraduate students (Henrich et al., 2010). This WEIRD
population (Western Educated Industrialized Rich Democratic)
might be the least representative for all of humanity, and in
some areas it might even be the outlier (Henrich et al., 2010).
Our methods represent one step toward involving participants
of different ages, nationalities, and with different educational
backgrounds, enabling us to draw more general conclusions
about humans.
Definition of Problem Solving Stages
There seems to be a consensus in the literature that inactivity and
repetitions are behavioral correlates of impasse, and that during
the search stage the problem solver makes newmoves, so we used
gaps, plateaus and slopes as the behavioral signals of different
stages of problem solving. Our definitions of slope and plateau
are arbitrary to some extent: we set three moves as the minimum
length of these stages. Setting them shorter would have made the
sequence of stages intractable, while setting them longer would
have resulted in ignoring too many transient moves. For gaps,
we used the most common outlier criterion, i.e., longer than
the average move time plus two SDs. Here, the balance is also
between identifying too many or too few gaps.
As can be seen in Figure 1, the initial configuration of
sticks was symmetric. Consequently, there were four different
sites where a solution could occur and the symmetric moves
were equivalent. For our analyses, we decided not to take into
consideration the symmetry of the figure and when we counted
the number of explored grid positions, we did not collapse
equivalent positions into the same category. We did this, because
it turned out that participants did not use all segments of the
figure equivalently: the top left portion was used less often than
the rest.
Future Research
Future research should include adapting our methods of defining
problem solving stages in other insight problems. The nine
dot problem seems to be a good candidate, because it is also
a multistep problem with a discretized search space where
participants make relatively many moves.
Another interesting direction would be to try to find the
neural correlates of problem solving stages and thus to add the
neural level of description to the narrative. So far, most brain
imaging studies tried to find the neural correlates of insight
(Dietrich and Kanso, 2010; Dietrich and Haider, 2014; Kounios
and Beeman, 2014), but now that we can pinpoint the beginning
and the end of all problem solving stages we could look at the
difference between brain activity during all the different stages of
problem solving.
The restructuring hypothesis does not explain the process
that generates the candidate hypotheses during conscious search
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and the process that leads to restructuring. Bayesian models
explain how hypotheses (candidate solutions) are selected but
most of them take the initial population of hypotheses as a given,
except some notable exceptions (Kemp and Tenenbaum, 2008).
A process generating candidate hypotheses seems to be a must.
A question is how a mental search in the hypothesis space is
conducted. It remains to be seen whether an evolutionary search
(as in Darwinian neurodynamics, Fernando et al., 2012) could
ultimately explain the observations; this we shall consider in a
subsequent paper.
To sum up, we pioneered a new method for finding problem
solving stages in the five square problem based on solely
behavioral data. The analysis of problem solving stages revealed
a discrepancy between existing stage models of insight problem
solving and our data, which highlights the need for revising the
models and to further investigate problem solving stages on the
individual level.
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